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Whether we like it or not and whether we actually think it works or not, the Company Directors'
Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA) has proved to be a significant measure in political, cultural and legal
terms. Since publication of a National Audit Office Report in 1993 critical of the Insolvency Service's
enforcement efforts, there has been a dramatic increase in the volume of disqualification proceedings.
The number of disqualification orders made by the courts in disqualification proceedings is now
running at in excess of 1,000 per annum.1 A sharpening of rhetoric has accompanied this increase in
activity. The Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) press releases from the last five years or so
use colourful and vigorous language. Here are just a few examples: “Dodgy Directors Top of
Insolvency Service's Hitlist” (August 15, 1995), “78% More ‘Bad Bosses’ Banned by Insolvency
Service” (February 20, 1996), “Unfit Directors of ‘Phoenix’ Companies Grounded as Disqualification
Orders Soar” (November 12, 1996), “Griffiths Goes Gunning Against Cowboy Directors” (June 5,
1997), “Griffiths Promises No Let Up in Campaign to Ban Rogue Directors” (April 30, 1998),
“Insolvency Service is Winning Battle in Clamp Down on Dodgy Directors” (November 30, 1999),
“Clamp Down on Dodgy Directors Continues” (April 18, 2000). All of this suggests that there remains
a strong political commitment to the disqualification regime and a determination in official circles to
foster the general perception that disqualified directors, whatever their conduct, are no better than
“crooks”.
At the same time, the DTI is doing its best to sustain a parallel discourse of entrepreneurship,
competitiveness and enterprise2 and to promote a culture altogether more forgiving (and more
“American”) in its attitude towards business failure.3 As in all things, there remains a recognition that a
balance needs to be struck and that too much “freedom” may lead to “abuse”. Old liberal ideologies
are being repackaged and updated to take account of globalisation and the arrival of the information
age. Company law retains its regulatory agenda alongside its facilitative agenda, a point made clear
by the Steering Committee of the DTI Company Law Review. However, those responsible for the
reform of mainstream or “core” company law often lose sight of the structural importance of
insolvency law (and here I am thinking in particular of CDDA, s.6) within the overall scheme of
corporate regulation.
It is accepted wisdom that insolvency law plays a part in striking the balance between enterprise and
abuse of limited liability. In his well-known text, Sir Roy Goode suggests that one of the overriding
objectives of corporate insolvency law is “to provide a mechanism by which the causes of failure can
be identified and those guilty of mismanagement brought to book and, where appropriate, deprived of
the right to be involved in the management of other companies”.4 A similar view was expressed in the
Cork Report.5 However, the disqualification regime in CDDA, ss.6-7 purports to be more than merely
pathological. The strong consensus emerging from the case law is that the CDDA is concerned with
protecting the public from “rogue” directors and that protection is achieved in three ways:
(a) by keeping the errant director “off the road”;
(b) by deterring him from “misbehaving” in the future (individual deterrence); and
*Insolv. L. 87 (c) through general deterrence, i.e. by encouraging other directors to behave properly.6
Whether the CDDA does have a deterrent effect is open to doubt but we should not lose sight of the
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claim being made about the disqualification regime here. Disqualification proceedings under CDDA,
ss.6-8 are brought in the public interest and purport, through notions of individual and general
deterrence, to be concerned with the upholding and advancement of public standards of commercial
morality. Thus, through the mechanism of CDDA, s.6, as interpreted by the courts, the remit of
insolvency law has arguably widened. Not only is it concerned with bringing wrongdoers to book, it
also purports to lay down ex post, on a case by case basis, what amount to general standards of
governance for directors of struggling companies. As well as being a source of new standards, it is
arguable that disqualification is now the principal means by which the general law of directors'
obligations is moulded and enforced. The best illustration so far is the Barings case.7 The immediate
question there was whether the conduct of the Barings executives made them unfit to be concerned
in the management of a company under CDDA, s.6(1). In analysing this question, the court drew on
modern Australian and American authorities to reformulate the duties of care, skill and diligence
laying particular emphasis on the supervisory responsibilities of directors.8 Thus, the impact of the
CDDA in creating a modern discourse of commercial morality within company law has been quite
considerable. However, this is generally overlooked and an artificial division is maintained between
so-called “core” company law and insolvency law when we should perhaps be asking questions about
the relationship between the two. As a consequence, the reforms of the CDDA discussed in the rest
of this article have, by and large, slipped unnoticed onto the statute book: a seemingly uncontroversial
“add-on” to an Insolvency Bill. There is a case for saying that 15 years on from the enactment of the
CDDA, we should be conducting a fuller assessment of its place in the regulatory scheme, especially
when a full-scale review of company law is already in train.9 It is perhaps ironic that the principal
change brought about by the Insolvency Act 2000, the advent of disqualification undertakings
(discussed below), may serve to reduce the visibility of the CDDA still further and reinforce *Insolv. L.
88 the existing tendency to treat disqualification as a thing apart from company law.10
Disqualification undertakings: origins and purpose
The law on undertakings pre-Insolvency Act 2000
The most important substantive reform to the CDDA is contained in Insolvency Act 2000, s.6. This
inserts a new section 1A into the CDDA providing a means by which disqualification can be achieved
administratively without the involvement of the court. Under this “fast-track” system, the Secretary of
State will be empowered to accept undertakings equivalent in effect to a disqualification order in
cases where the director consents to being disqualified and the parties can reach agreement on the
period of disqualification. Broadly speaking, prior to the amendment, it was not possible for
disqualification cases to be compromised in this way. In the leading case of Re Blackspur Group plc,
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Davies, 11 the Court of Appeal held that the Secretary of
State's decision to continue disqualification proceedings against the defendant, despite an offer of
undertakings, was not open to review. In the court's view, the Secretary of State was entitled to refuse
an offer of undertakings for the following reasons:
(1) Once proceedings were on foot, it was for the court and not for the parties to decide whether or
not a disqualification order should be made. Under CDDA, ss.6(1) and 8(2), the court could only make
a disqualification order if it was “satisfied” that the director's conduct made him unfit. As the court was
required to be “satisfied” of the director's unfitness, the judge could not be asked to make a
disqualification order by consent of the parties without first forming a view on the underlying merits.12
(2) The means by which protection of the public was to be achieved was embodied in a detailed
legislative scheme which did not provide for the disposal of proceedings on the basis of undertakings.
The Secretary of State was entitled to adhere to that statutory scheme in the interests of good
regulation.
(3) Moreover, the undertakings offered, even though they were expressed to be permanent in
duration, did not provide the public with the same level of protection as that afforded by a
disqualification order. There were three reasons why an undertaking not to act as a director or in any
other prohibited capacity was not identical in effect to a disqualification order made by the court. First,
breach of undertaking would not automatically give rise to the statutory consequences for
contravention of a disqualification order in CDDA, ss.13-15. Secondly, there was no statutory
procedure governing the grant of leave to act under an undertaking. Thirdly, there was no scope for
undertakings to be entered on the register of disqualification orders which the Secretary of State is
required to maintain under CDDA, s.18(2).
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In the earlier cases of Re Homes Assured Corporation plc 13 and Re Company X, 14 the court did stay
disqualification proceedings where undertakings acceptable to the Secretary of State had been
offered. However, the true rationale of these cases may lie in the court's jurisdiction to dismiss
proceedings as an abuse of process in circumstances where there are doubts about whether the
defendant will receive a fair trial. For example, in Homes Assured, the court was satisfied on medical
evidence that it would have been “hazardous and difficult” to embark on a lengthy trial in which the
defendant would be giving evidence and acting in his own defence. There is a third case in which
proceedings were stayed on the basis that undertakings had been offered.15 However, this case is
hard to reconcile with Blackspur. These exceptional cases aside, the prevailing view, epitomised by
the decision in Blackspur, was that legislative intervention was required to make it *Insolv. L. 89
permissible for disqualification cases to be compromised on undertakings without court involvement.
Carecraft disposals
It was possible under the old law for civil disqualification proceedings to be disposed of on a summary
basis using a procedure sanctioned by Ferris J. in Re Carecraft Construction Co. Ltd 16 and approved
by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Rogers. 17 Under the Carecraft
procedure, the parties can put a statement of agreed or non-contested facts before the court and
invite the court to make a disqualification order for a specified period or a period within an agreed
range of years. Thus, the parties negotiate and agree a basis on which the court is then asked to
dispose of the matter without the need for a full hearing. It is the essence of Carecraft that the court is
not strictly bound by the agreement reached by the parties. The court must make its own findings
based on the statement. In theory, the court could hold that the conduct described in the agreed
statement is of insufficient gravity to merit a finding of unfitness. Equally, the court might be satisfied
that the agreed conduct makes the director unfit but disagree with the parties' assessment of the
appropriate period. If the court disagrees with the parties on either question, the case is adjourned to
a full hearing with both sides able to adduce evidence in the normal way. The Carecraft procedure
has proved something of a success and is used widely in CDDA, s.6 cases.18 Although, in practice,
the judge rarely disagrees with the parties' assessment, the court remains the ultimate arbiter and a
summary disposal results in the making of a disqualification order. As we saw above, it is the absence
of precisely these features which led the Court of Appeal to conclude in Blackspur that the Secretary
of State was entitled to reject an offer of undertakings and proceed to trial.
Reform
Despite the relative success of Carecraft, support grew in the second half of the 1990s for the idea
that the CDDA should be amended to enable the Secretary of State to settle disqualification cases in
a way that achieved the same legal effect as a disqualification order without the court having to hear
the matter at all, even on a summary basis. The first public call for reform was made by the then
Vice-Chancellor, Sir Richard Scott in December 1995. In a Practice Direction19 aimed in part at
streamlining Carecraft, he made the following observations and recommendation:
“Under the 1986 Act, there is no alternative but for all applications for disqualification orders, no
matter what state of agreement there may be between the parties, to be processed through the court
machinery and made by a judge or registrar after a court hearing. I regard this as unnecessary and
avoidable. I would recommend, accordingly, that the Secretary of State give consideration to the
possibility of introducing amending legislation, under which an agreement between a director and the
Secretary of State, or the Official Receiver, as to the disqualification period to be applied to the
director, be given the same effect as a court order imposing the disqualification period. If the director
is willing to bar himself from acting as a director for a period that the Secretary of State, or Official
Receiver regards as being sufficient to protect the public interest, I do not see why time and money
should be expended by insistence on bringing the case before the court.”
Similar judicial recommendations were made in the course of subsequent Carecraft cases20 and were
echoed by the Court of Appeal in Blackspur. 21 There can be little doubt that this growth in judicial
support for a statutory system of undertakings was a reflection of the increasing pressure that
disqualification cases were bringing to bear on court resources. In particular, there was a strong
feeling that Carecraft was little more than a rubber-stamping exercise that did not merit the amount of
court time devoted to it. The government's response to these calls for reform is enshrined in section 6
of the Insolvency Act 2000.
The political justification for the new undertakings regime appears to rest on the following four factors:
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*Insolv. L. 90 (1) Reduced cost to the taxpayer. It was suggested during the parliamentary debate on
the Insolvency Bill that undertakings will save the DTI an estimated £300,000 per annum.22 While
there was praise for Carecraft, it was felt that the procedure still involved unnecessary costs such as
the costs of negotiating the statement of agreed facts and attending court.23
(2) Better regulation. Where disqualification proceedings are pending, the defendant director is not
legally prohibited from acting as a director or from being concerned or taking part in the management
of a company. So, for example, in a CDDA, s.6 case, the director remains at large from the moment
the relevant company becomes insolvent within the meaning of section 6(2) right up to the point that a
disqualification order is made either at trial or on a Carecraft disposal. During that period, (which
could be as long as three or four years bearing in mind that the Secretary of State has two years in
which to commence proceedings under section 7(2)), the public are not legally protected. The new
regime is touted as a “fast-track” procedure that will improve regulation. The hope is that it will allow
more directors to be processed more quickly and thus result in earlier protection for the public.24
(3) Savings in court resources. It is clear that a major aim of the undertakings regime is to reduce
pressure on court resources. As we will see below, the Secretary of State is able to accept
undertakings and dispose of cases even before formal proceedings are commenced. Cases dealt
with in this way will be taken out of the court system altogether. The House was told that, on current
figures, only 10 per cent of disqualification proceedings are contested and go to a full trial. Of the
remainder, 30 per cent are disposed of by agreement (presumably using Carecraft ), while 60 per
cent are simply uncontested.25 It appears that the Government sees undertakings as a means of
reducing court time spent hearing Carecraft cases and dealing with uncontested applications. In this
sense, the new regime can also be seen as a response to the considerable expansion of directors'
disqualification touched upon in the opening section. Since the early 1990s, the CDDA has grown
from a cottage industry into a significant and sizeable legal enterprise. The need for undertakings
suggests that disqualification has become a victim of the relative success it has enjoyed over the last
decade.
(4) Benefit to directors. Undertakings appear to have some benefits for directors though these were
not strongly emphasised by the Government. First, directors who are prepared to give undertakings at
an early stage will presumably save themselves costs. Secondly, undertakings should make the
position of directors more certain. Although directors are free to act until a disqualification order is
made, it is difficult for them to make any forward plans while proceedings are pending. For those
wishing to return to company management in the future, undertakings also offer the prospect of a
quicker turnaround.
The new provisions introduced by section 6 of the Insolvency Act 2000 are now considered in detail.
The basic scope of the undertakings regime
The key features of the new regime26 are as follows:
(1) Undertakings are only available in “unfitness” cases, i.e. cases falling within CDDA, ss.6 or 8.
There is no logical reason why undertakings should not be made available in other forms of civil
disqualification proceeding, i.e. cases under CDDA, ss.2, 3 and 4. However, the majority of cases are
brought under sections 6-8 and so the decision to concentrate on “unfitness” cases probably reflects
the relative weight of numbers.27
(2) The decision to accept an undertaking is exclusively within the discretion of the Secretary of State.
Hitherto, the Secretary of State's discretion has been merely prosecutorial. Proceedings can only be
commenced “if it *Insolv. L. 91 appears to the Secretary of State that it is expedient in the public
interest that a disqualification order should be made” (CDDA, ss.7(1) and 8(1)). Under the new
regime, the Secretary of State enjoys a wider discretion. Before the Secretary of State can accept an
undertaking, two criteria must be applied. First, the Secretary of State must assess whether the
conditions in CDDA, ss.6(1) or 8(1) (as appropriate) are satisfied, i.e. it must appear to the Secretary
of State from the material available that the director's conduct makes him unfit. It follows that the
question of “unfitness” is no longer exclusively a matter for the court. Secondly, the Secretary of State
must consider that it is expedient in the public interest to accept an undertaking (instead of applying,
or proceeding with an application, for a disqualification order) (CDDA, ss.7(2A) and 8(2A)). Subject to
agreement between the parties, the upshot is that a director can be disqualified exclusively by
administrative means. Clearly, the Secretary of State's decision to accept or refuse an undertaking is
justiciable.28 A decision to refuse an undertaking is susceptible to judicial review in the normal way
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and, as in the Blackspur case, an application for review can be made in the main disqualification
proceedings. In cases where undertakings are accepted, CDDA, s.8A builds a supervisory jurisdiction
into the machinery of the Act. Under section 8A, the court has the power to vary an undertaking by
reducing the period for which it is to be in force or it can discharge an undertaking altogether. Quite
how section 8A will operate in practice is a point taken up further below.
(3) The Secretary of State can accept undertakings either before or during proceedings. This is clear
from the wording of CDDA, ss.7(2A) and 8(2A) which expressly provide that undertakings can be
accepted as an alternative to “applying, or proceeding with an application, for a disqualification order”.
An offer of undertakings is unlikely to be considered before the point at which the Secretary of State
would ordinarily decide to bring proceedings. This is because the Secretary of State is required by
CDDA, ss.7(2A) and 8(2A) to form a view on the merits.29 It is anticipated that the normal reporting
and pre-action investigative procedures will be allowed to run their course. The likelihood is that the
director will be formally advised of the possibility of undertakings in the letter before action that the
Secretary of State is required to send in order to comply with CDDA, s.16(1).30 It follows that a
director will not be able to offer undertakings e.g. within a couple of weeks of his company going into
liquidation and before the office holder has had the opportunity to compile a “D” report.31
(4) An undertaking will have exactly the same legal effect as a disqualification order. The prohibition
must be drawn in the same terms as an order (compare CDDA, s.1A(1) and s.1(1) as amended by
Insolvency Act 2000, s.5(1)). A period of disqualification falling within the statutory boundaries must
be specified (CDDA, ss.1A(1)-(2)). Sanctions for breach of an undertaking are identical to those for
breach of an order (CDDA, ss.13-15, as amended by Insolvency Act 2000, Sched. 4, Pt. I, paras.
8-10). Provision is made for the court to grant leave to act (CDDA, ss.1A(1) and 17(3), as substituted
by Insolvency Act 2000, Sched. 4, Pt. I, para. 12). The framework is also in place for particulars of
undertakings to be entered on the register of disqualification orders (CDDA, s.18 as amended by
Insolvency Act 2000, Sched. 4, Pt. I, para. 13). These amendments meet the objections raised in the
Blackspur case.
Practical implications
This section of the article discusses practical issues and assesses the likely overall impact of
disqualification undertakings.
Impact on Carecraft
Where the director is minded to accept disqualification and the parties can agree both the conduct
and the period of disqualification, the case can now be settled on *Insolv. L. 92 undertakings. This
suggests that the Carecraft procedure is now surplus to requirements. Indeed, it is arguable that one
of the underlying objects of the new regime is to eliminate the need for Carecraft and, accordingly,
save court time spent on Carecraft cases. A director who does not contest the case appears to have
nothing to gain by insisting on the full rigours of Carecraft. However, there are two circumstances in
which it is conceivable that Carecraft could still be used from time to time. First, there are cases
where the parties agree the conduct but disagree on the appropriate period of disqualification. It is
possible that the court could be asked to determine the period having regard to the agreed conduct.32
Secondly, Carecraft could presumably be used in civil disqualification proceedings under CDDA,
ss.2-4 where undertakings are not available.
Statements of fact
As we have seen, the Secretary of State must form a view on the underlying merits when considering
whether to accept an undertaking. It is clear that, in contrast to Carecraft, the parties are not formally
required to agree a statement of facts. However, for both practical and philosophical reasons, there
appears to be a need for at least some formal record of the conduct underlying the Secretary of
State's decision. First, there is the question of future proceedings by the director either for leave to act
while disqualified under CDDA, s.17 or to have the undertaking varied or discharged under CDDA,
s.8A. In such proceedings, the court will need to be given a clear idea as to the factual basis of the
disqualification. This is particularly important on an application for leave where the nature and
seriousness of the applicant's previous conduct is highly material.33 Secondly, there are questions of
publicity and transparency. Disqualification of directors is justified on a rationale of public protection
(including protection through general deterrence) and the Secretary of State is required, in deciding
whether to accept an undertaking, to consider the public interest. In keeping with that rationale, there
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is a strong case for saying that details of the conduct forming the basis for disqualification in the
individual case should be a matter of public record. Disqualification orders and undertakings differ in
terms of public accessibility. An order is made on the basis of a judgment given in open court. The
reasons for the disqualification are readily accessible. Similarly, in Carecraft proceedings, a judgment
is given and it is standard practice for the agreed statement of facts to be annexed to the order.34
However, in the absence of a statement of facts that could be publicised, for example, by means of
press release, the factual basis of a disqualification undertaking may not obviously be within the
public domain.
Both these issues were raised during the passage of the Insolvency Bill through Parliament. The
Trade and Industry Select Committee formed the view that there could usefully be express legislative
provision for a statement of facts on which the undertaking was based so as to assist the court in
future proceedings.35 Concerns about lack of transparency and publicity were also aired.36 However,
the Government was unconvinced. Its formal response to the Select Committee stated that, “we are
mindful … of the danger of placing too much emphasis on the form of the procedure (statement of
unfitted conduct) rather than on the substance of the underlying legislation (early provision of the
protection for business and for the public generally which the CDDA is intended to provide)”.37 In the
Government's view, there was a risk that a mandatory requirement for an agreed statement of facts
would end up reintroducing cost and delay.38 Thus, it is theoretically possible for the Secretary of
State to accept an undertaking offered by a director who disputes some or all of the allegations of
unfit conduct. Equally, however, it is anticipated that, in practice, the Secretary of State will try to
agree the unfit conduct and incorporate any agreement in a statement of facts, albeit in much shorter
form than a Carecraft statement. It is current practice for the Secretary of State to include a schedule
of unfit conduct in summary form in the CDDA, s.16 letter. It is likely that this will provide the basis for
any short-form statement of facts.39
Plea-bargaining
The Institute of Directors, among others, is concerned that directors offered the option of an
undertaking will be put under undue pressure to accept it, rather than having their day in court. Their
fear is that a plea-bargaining culture could *Insolv. L. 93 develop along the lines of, “accept a
three-year disqualification undertaking, or else we will go to court and press for five years”.40 One
would have thought that some degree of plea-bargaining is inevitable especially as negotiations will
presumably be conducted “without prejudice”. However, the Secretary of State is constrained to
accept undertakings only if it appears to him that it is expedient in the public interest that he should do
so. This suggests that an undertaking will only be accepted if the period approximates to that which,
in the Secretary of State's assessment, the court would order in disqualification proceedings.41 It
follows that there may be scope for plea-bargaining within a particular Sevenoaks bracket. However,
there does not appear to be much scope for the Secretary of State to engage in drastic
plea-bargaining across the Sevenoaks brackets (e.g. by accepting an undertaking for two years in a
case that he considers falls squarely within the middle bracket of six to 10 years).42 One assumes that
the “culture” will not be far removed from that which has developed in relation to Carecraft. Ultimately,
it is clear that the Secretary of State could ask the court to make a disqualification order for a different
period than that on offer via an undertaking. This seems fair enough bearing in mind that the evidence
before the court in contested proceedings may differ in scope from the material available to the
Secretary of State at the time the undertaking was under contemplation.
Ironically (in light of the concern expressed by the Institute of Directors), there may be scope for the
Secretary of State to offer limited discounts as an incentive to early settlement. The reason for this is
that the court's discretion in fixing the appropriate period does not correspond exactly with the
Secretary of State's administrative discretion to accept an undertaking. While, in fixing the period of
disqualification, the court acts with the broad scheme of the CDDA in mind, its primary focus is on the
seriousness of the proven conduct.43 By way of subtle contrast, the Secretary of State is required
directly to consider the public interest. Bearing in mind the purposes of the undertakings regime, the
public interest may be wide enough to justify some discount in order to secure the benefits of earlier
protection and saving of cost.
Costs
One factor that may encourage directors to agree to an undertaking is that of costs. The usual rule
where the court makes a disqualification order in contested proceedings is that the Secretary of State
is entitled to his costs on the “loser pays” principle. If an undertaking is offered and accepted without
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proceedings having to be issued, the director will usually face no adverse costs consequences.
Where undertakings are accepted during proceedings, the Secretary of State will have to discontinue
the proceedings. The usual rule where proceedings are discontinued is that the claimant pays the
defendant's costs. However, this rule is reversed by paragraph 28.1 of the reissued Practice
Direction: Directors' Disqualification Proceedings which provides that the director will generally be
required to pay the Secretary of State's costs where proceedings are discontinued because of
acceptance of an undertaking. Thus, from the point of view of costs, directors are better off settling
sooner rather than later.44
One intriguing question is whether there is any scope for a director to make an offer of undertakings
on a Calderbank basis, i.e. an offer “without prejudice save as to costs” 45 to the effect that he is
prepared to accept a disqualification for, say, a fixed period of four years. Calderbank offers are
commonly used in other types of civil proceeding to shift the risk of adverse costs. If the claimant wins
at trial but does not beat the defendant's Calderbank offer, the court may deprive the claimant of all or
part of his costs. Thus, in theory, if the court disqualified our Calderbanking director for only three
years, the Secretary of State could arguably be at risk on costs. However, there is little correlation
between disqualification proceedings and the types of proceedings in which Calderbank offers are
typically made. In offering the undertaking, the director would have to identify clearly the factual basis
on which it was being offered. In contested proceedings, the material before the court, which would
include the defendant's affidavit evidence, might differ in a number of respects from the material
underpinning the director's offer of undertakings. Moreover, as was argued above, there are subtle
differences between the court's discretion in relation to the period of disqualification and the *Insolv.
L. 94 Secretary of State's discretion to accept undertakings. For these reasons, Calderbank offers
are unlikely to be widely used.
When does an undertaking come into force?
CDDA, s.1A makes no provision for when an undertaking is to come into force. This contrasts with the
position under CDDA, s.1 (as amended by Insolvency Act 2000, s.5(2)). This provides, subject to
contrary order of the court, that the period of disqualification does not start to run until 21 days have
elapsed, counting from the date of the order. It follows that a disqualification order will not usually
have immediate effect. The 21-day period of grace gives the disqualified person a useful period of
breathing space during which he can re-arrange his affairs without being in breach of the
disqualification order while he does so. Without it, a person who loses contested disqualification
proceedings would be faced with considerable practical difficulties in respect of any current
directorships. CDDA, s.1 (as amended) gives him a short time to resign those positions and, where
necessary, take steps in conjunction with the relevant company or companies to appoint a
replacement.46 There seems no good reason why, in practice, the Secretary of State should not
accept undertakings on a similar basis. However, the failure to make express provision in section 1A
does cast doubt on the Secretary of State's power to allow the director a 21-day period of grace. The
answer may be that the undertaking is essentially contractual in nature and that as long as its
contents comply in all respects with CDDA, s.1A it will be open to the director to say, “I undertake not
to act in a prohibited capacity for a period of x years beginning 21 days hence”. If this course is not
available and the Secretary of State is not prepared to delay acceptance of the undertaking, then,
technically speaking, the director would need to apply to the court for a short period of leave to act.
Leave to act under disqualification undertakings
It is important to note that the Secretary of State has no power to grant a disqualified director leave to
act. Thus, the Secretary of State cannot accept an undertaking on the footing that the director will
have leave to act in relation to one or more specified companies. It is quite common for a director to
make his application for leave in the main disqualification proceedings. Indeed, the practice is
encouraged by the courts on the ground that it saves costs. However, a director who is prepared to
accept an undertaking but wants leave, e.g. to continue in a current directorship must make a free
standing application to the court. In the intervening period between acceptance of the undertaking
and the hearing of his application for leave, the director will be unable to act. Moreover, subject to
what was said above about the 21-day grace period, the Secretary of State has no power to grant
interim leave pending the hearing of the director's application. The best the Secretary of State can do
in this situation is to persuade the director to accept the undertaking on the footing that, subject to
agreeable conditions, he will not oppose the application for leave. As the question of leave is entirely
a matter for the court, the Secretary of State cannot guarantee any particular outcome, e.g. that leave
will be granted subject to conditions x and y. The position is therefore no more attractive than that
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facing a director in the same situation under Carecraft. There too, the director faces the prospect of
uncertainty in the period between the Carecraft disposal and the hearing of his application for leave.47
This is not to say that the Secretary of State should be given power to grant leave.48 However, it is
important that directors are advised (a) that leave to act can only be granted by the court, (b) that
once an undertaking is accepted, they cannot act pending hearing of their application for leave unless
the court grants them interim leave in the meantime, and (c) that the court is likely to order them to
pay any costs incurred by the Secretary of State in connection with the hearing of their application.
Section 8A proceedings for variation or discharge of undertakings
There is little doubt that the immediate purpose of CDDA, s.8A is to demonstrate the compatibility of
the undertakings regime with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Trade and Industry
Select Committee were concerned that the new procedure would put the DTI in the position of
investigator, prosecutor and *Insolv. L. 95 judge.49 In empowering the court to vary or discharge
undertakings, Parliament appears to have responded to this concern. It is not easy to predict the sort
of grounds on which the court will be prepared to entertain a section 8A(1)(b) application.50 It is
anticipated that, initially at least, some directors will try their luck and apply to have their undertakings
quashed on grounds that they were subjected to undue pressure or that the nature and effect of the
undertaking was not fully explained to them. If fresh information comes to light casting doubt on the
Secretary of State's view on the merits, that too may give grounds for review. Applications to reduce
the period of an undertaking under section 8A(1)(a) will presumably be based on the ground that the
period agreed is too long and that the public interest will be adequately served by a shorter period. It
is submitted that the courts are likely to give the Secretary of State a wide margin of appreciation and
deal robustly with applications under section 8A. Otherwise, the system, which is designed to achieve
“fast-track” disqualifications, could become self-defeating. So, for example, on an application to vary
the period, the court is likely to adopt a “broad-brush” approach and refuse to intervene where the
period of the undertaking falls within a reasonable range.
Conclusion
The Disqualification Unit is likely to come under political pressure to make the new undertakings
regime work and efficiency gains should result. Undertakings are likely to prove very useful in the
case of individuals who no longer wish to be directors or who have no immediate plans to become
involved again in the management of companies. For directors who want to return to managing
companies in the future, there is some prospect of a quicker turnaround. Cases can now be resolved
more quickly and at lower cost. A director who gives, say, a three-year disqualification undertaking will
be back in the market place more quickly than a director who contests a similar case to trial and
receives a three-year disqualification from the court. If the Secretary of State is able to offer some
discount on period (as discussed above), then this combined with the adverse costs implications of
proceedings should create sufficient incentive for directors to settle by resorting to undertakings. We
should expect to see a sizeable reduction in the number of Carecraft cases. At the same time, there
will always be directors who want to fight and the availability of undertakings will do nothing to deter
them. It is also questionable whether undertakings will reduce the number of cases that come before
the courts uncontested because the defendant simply chooses to ignore the proceedings. As
mentioned above, there are one or two procedural issues that need ironing out. In particular, it will be
interesting to see how practice develops with regard to statements of fact. We can also expect an
initial surge of applications under section 8A. On balance, the advent of undertakings is likely to mean
less rather than more work for lawyers arising out of the CDDA in the future.
The scope of the prohibition
Section 5(1) of the Insolvency Act 2000 amends CDDA, s.1 to make it clear that a disqualified person
is absolutely prohibited from acting in any office that requires him to be qualified as an insolvency
practitioner. Before the amendment, it appeared on the face of CDDA, s.1 that the court had
jurisdiction to grant a disqualified person leave to act as a liquidator or administrator. This gave rise to
an anomaly because the effect of Insolvency Act 1986, s.390(4)(b) is that any person made the
subject of a CDDA disqualification order automatically loses their qualification to act as an insolvency
practitioner. The better view was always that the absolute ban in section 390 overrode the qualified
ban in CDDA, s.1. The amendment now makes this crystal clear.51
Jurisdictional issues
Page8
Schedule 4 to the Insolvency Act 2000 makes a series of minor amendments to the CDDA. Of these,
the most important (apart from those already mentioned earlier *Insolv. L. 96 in parenthesis) are the
amendments to CDDA, s.6(3). These resolve various problems of jurisdiction that defendants have
sought to use to challenge the validity of proceedings.52 Section 6(3), as originally enacted, used the
present tense to identify the court having jurisdiction. So, for example, in the case of a director of a
company “which is being wound up”, the relevant court under former section 6(3)(a) is “the court by
which the company is being wound up”. Two problems arose that had a particular impact on county
court jurisdiction. First, did the court which had jurisdiction when proceedings were commenced cease
to have jurisdiction once the winding-up process was completed and the company was no longer
“being wound up”? Secondly, where the registered office of the company was changed (e.g. by the
liquidator), was the relevant court the county court for the district of the new registered office or the
county court for the district of the registered office as at the date of the winding-up? The courts
decided pragmatically that jurisdiction should be tested by reference to the commencement of
disqualification proceedings. Thus, on the first question, if the court had jurisdiction when proceedings
were commenced, it did not lose it simply because the winding-up was completed while proceedings
were still pending.53 Similarly, proceedings were properly commenced in the county court for the
district of the company's registered office as at the date of commencement.54 The amendments make
it clear (a) that the court retains jurisdiction even once the relevant insolvency process has come to
an end, and (b) that the correct county court in which to bring proceedings is the court for the district
of the company's registered office as at the commencement of the relevant insolvency process.55
Significantly, new section 6(3B) of the CDDA expressly validates proceedings commenced in the
wrong court and gives that court discretion to retain such proceedings. Thus, Parliament has followed
the example of the courts by seeking to ensure that jurisdictional obstacles do not derail
disqualification proceedings.
This article is an updated version of an address given by the writer to the Annual Conference of the
Insolvency Lawyers' Association on March 10, 2001. The assistance of Malcolm Davis-White, 4 Stone
Buildings, Lincoln's and Felicity Toube, 3-4 South Square, Grays Inn is gratefully acknowledged. Any
errors remain the sole responsibility of the writer.
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